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Abstract
One of the striking features of many developing Regional Integration Areas
(RIAs) is the strong asymmetry between countries. In this paper, we consider
a three-country two-sector model in a footloose capital framework. Two of
these countries are involved in a regional integration process while the third is
left out of the union. They are “port-like” economies where only one region is
endowed with international infrastructures, so that imports and exports between
trading partners necessarily pass through this transit region. The comparative
statics of our model show that better domestic transport infrastructure helps
to attract a higher share of footloose activity when trade costs within the RIA
are lowered, inducing a persistent uneven spread of the mobile sector between
the member countries. If the domestic infrastructure levels of these countries
are both raised towards a high-quality level, a convergence process is triggered
to the disadvantage of the country left outside the RIA.
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11 Introduction
A glance at developing regional integration areas (RIAs henceforth) worldwide
points to hub-and-spokes patterns, where the hub country of the RIA serves as
the main gateway to the outside world. Motta and Norman (1996) and Puga
and Venables (1997) among others have shown that integrated countries attract
more ﬁrms because they oﬀer better access to regional markets. However, a hub
and spoke conﬁguration leads to an uneven spread of economic activities within
the RIA, and it induces higher administration and transportation costs (Kowal-
cyk and Wonnacott, 1992). This can create conﬂicts of interest among RIA
members, and in the past some RIAs collapsed because of dissatisﬁed members
complaining about having to share integration gains. The two following cases
illustrate the situation.
The Central American Common Market (CACM) was ﬁrst established in
December 1960 as a result of ten years of collaboration among El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.3 The CACM contributed to a boom
in intra-regional trade, but despite this success, it faced periodic diﬃculties
due to complaints on the redistribution of beneﬁts by Honduras and to some
extent Nicaragua. If the collapse of the CACM in 1969 was directly caused
by what has become known as the “soccer war”, the deep underlying reason
was the conﬂicting situation due to the favored place of El Salvador in the RIA
because of its better infrastructure endowment.4 Another interesting case is
3http://www.oneworld.org/acpsec/gb/summit/eca/eca.htm
4The “soccer war” is a ﬁve-day war triggered after the expulsion of thousands of immigrant
Salvadorans by Honduras during the 1970 World Cup preliminary tournament. See Vargas-
2the collapse of the East African Community (comprising three East African
countries: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) in 1977. In an article titled “Rebirth
of the East Africa Cooperation”, Percival (1997) argues that “the ﬁnal collapse
of the East African Community, which survived for a decade up until 1977,
was provoked by disagreements over the beneﬁts gained by each state from
the operation of common regional services such as the airline, harbours and
telecommunication”. Hazlewood (1979) analyzes these tensions within the East
African Community (EAC) and posits that the hub position of Kenya was a
key reason for this collapse (ideological diﬀerences between pro-communist and
pro-capitalists being another important source of discord).
The seminal paper by Krugman (1981) explains North-South development
gaps with a two-country two-factor model in which the initial discrepancy in
capital-labor ratio between (the) two countries cumulates over time and yields
a persistent uneven development. This paper stimulated many others trying
to explain North-South uneven development by diﬀerent mechanisms. Dutt
(1986) shows that trade in intermediate goods can support uneven development
between a core country exporting technologically advanced goods and a periph-
eral country which does not beneﬁt from learning eﬀects induced by such goods.
Kubo (1995) adds regional externalities to the common increasing returns to
scale sector of the Krugman model and derives diﬀerent regional development
patterns. Desmet (2000, 2002) introduces localized learning-by-doing eﬀects
leading to specialization and uneven development. All these papers address the
Hidalgo (1979) and Wionczek (1970).
3issue of the internal geography of a country or a union when trade is liberalized
with external partners, and many other recent papers also deal with this topic:
Krugman (1993), Krugman and Livas-Elizondo (1996), Montfort and Nicolini
(2000), Montfort and van Ypersele (2003), Behrens et al. (2003), Ago et al.
(2004) and Crozet and Koenig (2004).
However, none of these papers focuses on developing RIAs. One exception is
the paper by Golley (2002) that identiﬁes two related factors that yielded uneven
regional development of Chinese regions: on the one hand, the historical uneven
spread of the Chinese population due to the fact that it is a very large country
and on the other hand, the political choice of decentralization that maintained
this inequality over time. The paper by Martin and Rogers (1995) also gives
a ﬁrst insight into the topic. Examining the impact of public infrastructures
within RIAs, they found that ﬁrms tend to locate within countries with better
domestic infrastructures.
In this paper, we build a footloose capital model that extends the paper by
Martin and Rogers (1995) to address the speciﬁc issue of developing RIAs. We
consider a RIA formed by two developing countries and a third country repre-
senting the rest of the developing world, each of the three countries comprising
two regions: one principal region endowed with international trade infrastruc-
tures and a hinterland region. This conﬁguration characterizes most develop-
ing countries where capital cities play a major role in international transaction
because of their geographical locations and their endowment in international
infrastructures such as ports, airports, telecommunication equipment and ad-
4ministrative facilities.5 A comparative statics exercise help us to keep track of
the industrial share of each of the six regions under consideration. We ﬁnd that
as the intra-RIA trade costs decrease, the principal region of the member with
better domestic infrastructures attracts ﬁrms ﬁrst from its hinterland region,
then from the other RIA member, and ﬁnally from the third developing country
outside the RIA. If domestic infrastructures of the RIA members are harmo-
nized to a higher level, a convergence process of the industrial shares of their
principal regions is triggered, to the disadvantage of their hinterland regions
and the third developing country left out of the RIA.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we build a
footlose capital model inspired by Ottaviano and Thisse (2003) to analyze ﬁrms’
location as intra-RIA trade costs decrease. We then analyze the comparative
statics of the industrial shares of each region along with diﬀerent infrastructure
levels in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes the chapter.
2 The model
Let us consider a RIA formed by two developing countries denoted C1 and C2
and a third country C3 representing the rest of the developing world, each having
two regions. The domestic trade costs are respectively τ1, τ2 and τ3, and trade
costs between these countries are τ12, τ13 and τ23. These costs are all of the
5One can argue that even in developed countries, this diﬀerentiation exists. However, in
developing countries, the situation is typically exacerbated by the fact that all the adminis-
trative facilities are concentrated in the principal region, so that importers and exporters need
to be physically present there to ﬁnalize their trade operations. Venables (2003) theoretically
explains such a situation.
5iceberg type, that is a ﬁxed proportion of the traded good melts away during the
trading process. Transport infrastructure is assumed better in country 1 than
in country 2. That of country 3 can be better or worse than that of country 2.
Thus, the domestic transport costs are ranked as follows: τ1 < τ2 < τ3 or τ1 <
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Figure 1: Internal and external trade costs within a developing RIA.
Within each country, region 1 is the only one endowed with international
infrastructures, that is, all imports or exports between the trading partners
necessarily pass through region 1. For instance if a consumer located in region
2 of country 2 wants to import a good produced in region 2 of country 1, he
6has to support the domestic trade cost within country 1 (τ1), the external trade
cost between country 1 and country 2 (τ12) and the domestic trade cost within
country 2 (τ2).
We develop a home market eﬀect model in which the market advantage of a
location is due to a better market access through lower trade costs. All the trade
costs are thus exogenously set. We particularly focus on the intra-RIA trade
cost and make it continuously decrease. This variation induces a relocation
of the physical capital leading to a variation of the industrial share of each
of the six regions under consideration. We make the assumption that a higher
industrial share increases consumers welfare, so that the absence of an industrial
sector within a RIA member intensiﬁes conﬂicts of interest with other members,
and the RIA may collapse. This assumption holds if the cost of investing in
infrastructures is counterbalanced by the gains induced by ﬁrms relocation.
This issue is beyond the scope of this chapter which only tries to analyze ﬁrms
relocation within a RIA when domestic and international infrastructure are
improved.
2.1 When countries are in autarky
Let us consider that international trade costs are prohibitive so that all the
countries are in autarky. We can thus focus on a given country (country C1),
the case of the other countries being analogous. We have said that country C1
has two regions, R1 and R2, only region R1 being endowed with international
transaction infrastructures.
7There are two sectors producing two goods, an agricultural good (A) traded
costlessly and a manufacture good (M). There are two production factors:
labor (L) that is immobile and capital (K) that is perfectly mobile. In the
footloose capital setting, the capital is owned by workers so that the return
of this factor is spent in the region where the owner lives. The A sector is
perfectly competitive and produces a homogenous good under constant return
to scale using only labor. As in Baldwin et al (2004), we assume that the
non-full-specialization condition holds for this sector, which implies that each
of the six regions will receive some A-sector.6 The M sector is monopolistically
competitive, producing a diﬀerentiated good under increasing return to scale
and using labor (L) and capital (K). The distribution of workers and capital
is θ for region R1 and 1 − θ for region R2. In this study, we assume an even
distribution of workers and capitalists within the two regions (that is θ = 1/2
), and concentrate on the impact of domestic and international infrastructures
discrepancy on the location of M-ﬁrms.
Since good A is produced under constant return to scale and traded cost-
lessly, the wage in this sector will be equal to the price of good A at equilibrium
(w = pA) in both region R1 and R2.
To produce x1 (s) units of variety s of the diﬀerentiated good in region R1
for instance, we need a ﬁxed amount f of capital and a variable amount αx1 (s)
of labor, α being the marginal labor requirement to produce one unit of good
M. We can set f = 1 without any loss of generalization, and the total cost of a
6This condition is: (1 − µ)(Y1 + Y2) > pA (max{θ,1 − θ})(L1 + L2).
8ﬁrm producing variety s in region R1 is thus:
TC1 (s) = r1 + wαxh (s) (1)
where r1 is the rental rate of capital in region R1. We assume no scope economy
so that in equilibrium, each ﬁrm of the M-sector will produce only one variety
and consequently, the number of varieties will also be the number of ﬁrms oper-
ating in the sector. We assume the following Cobb-Douglas utility function for



















where A1 is the homogenous good, M1 is a composite of diﬀerentiated goods,
m1,1 (s) is the demand of variety s in region R1 from region R1, m1,2 (s) is the
demand of variety s in region R1 from region R2, n1 is the number of varieties
produced in region R1, n2 is the number of varieties produced in region R2, µ is
the share of the consumer’s income addressed to the diﬀerentiated good and σ is
the elasticity of substitution between varieties (σ > 1). The consumer’s problem
is to maximize his utility function under budget constraint so as to derive his
optimal demand for each good. If G1 is the price index of the diﬀerentiated











where Y1 is the consumer’s income in region R1. M∗
1 is in fact a CES aggregate














where p1,1 is the price set in region R1 by a representative ﬁrm located in region
R1, p1,2 is the price set in region R1 by a representative ﬁrm located in region













At equilibrium, all the ﬁrms set the same free on board price p and ﬁnal
consumers bear transport costs. The price index in the two regions of country
C1 can be written as:
G1,1 = (n1 + n2φ1)
1
1−σ p , G1,2 = (φ1n1 + n2)
1
1−σ p (6)
where φ1 = τ
1−σ
1 is a measure of trade “freeness”. Since τ is deﬁned on the
range [1;+∞) and σ > 1, φ1 will be close to 0 for very high transport costs and
close to 1 for very low transport costs.
The proﬁt of a typical ﬁrm located in region R1 of country C1 is:
10π1,1 = (m1,1 + τ1m1,2)(p − αw) − r1. (7)
If the A good is the numeraire, we will have w = pA = 1. The maximization
of the proﬁt function yields the optimal price to be set by this representative
ﬁrm: p = ασ/(σ − 1). We assume free entry and exit in the M-sector so that at
equilibrium, proﬁt should be zero and thus equation (7) leads to the following




(m1,1 + τ1m1,2) (8)
























Since capital moves freely between the two regions, the equilibrium rental
rate is necessary such that r1 = r2 = r, that is no ﬁrm in the M-sector has any
incentive to relocate to another region. Hence the equilibrium income within
each region is Y1 = θ(rK + L) and Y2 = (1 − θ)(rK + L). These conditions
combined with the last two equations some algebra yield:
11n1
n




where n = n1 + n2. Let us denote λ1 = n1/n, with 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1, which also
represents the fraction of capital employed in region R1 of country C1 so that
(θ − λ)K measures the extent of capital inﬂow or outﬂow in this region. This
suggests that a spatial equilibrium arises at λ1 if the diﬀerential in the rental
rate ∆r = (r1 − r2) is equal to zero.
Equation (11) shows the home market eﬀect: λ1 > θ if θ > 1/2, that is
the large region attracts an industrial share that is higher than the share of
capitalists located in this region. Equation (11) also indicates that λ1 increases
with the degree of freeness of trade (φ1) within country C1.
In this paper, we assume an even spread of workers and capital (θ = 1/2) and
it is obvious that the equilibrium spread of the M-ﬁrms reﬂects this symmetry
when prohibitive external trade costs hinder international trade. However, the
interesting point is to analyze how M-ﬁrms relocate as these international trade
costs decrease towards free trade level. This question is explored in the following
subsection.
2.2 When international trade occurs
Now, we consider that trade costs between countries are assumed non-prohibitive
within and outside the RIA. The point here is to extend the previous 2 ×2 × 2
model to a more complex model of three countries and six regions (see Figure 1
above). The three countries are denoted C1, C2 and C3, and within each coun-
12try, the regions will be denoted by the indices (1,1) (region R1 of country C1),
(1,2) (region R2 of country C1), (2,1) (region R1 of country C2), (2,2) (region
R2 of country C2), (3,1) (region R1 of country C3) and (3,2) for region R2 of
country C3. The description of the two production sectors when countries are in
autarky also prevails here and a ﬁrm located in a given region of a given country
will face six segmented markets. The optimal demand of a consumer located in









where p(1,1),(2,2) and G(1,1) are deﬁned analogously to price and price index in
Section 2.1: p(1,1),(2,2) represents the price set by a ﬁrm located in region R2
of country C2 selling in region R1 of country C1 and G(1,1) is the price index
in region R1 of country C1. All the key variables have to be deﬁned in the
six regions and we need a matrix formulation to encompass them in a simple
expression. Let G, N, λ and RR denote column vectors of dimension six, their
elements representing respectively price index (G), number of varieties or M-




















































                 

.
Let Φ be a 6 × 6 matrix deﬁned as follows:
Φ =

                 

1 φ1 φ12 φ12φ2 φ13 φ13φ3
φ1 1 φ12φ1 φ12φ1φ2 φ13φ1 φ13φ1φ3
φ12 φ12φ1 1 φ2 φ23 φ23φ3
φ12φ2 φ12φ1φ2 φ2 1 φ23φ2 φ23φ2φ3
φ13 φ13φ1 φ23 φ23φ2 1 φ3
φ13φ3 φ13φ1φ3 φ23φ3 φ23φ2φ3 φ3 1

                 

where φij = τ
1−σ
ij and φi = τ
1−σ
i , τij and τi deﬁned as in Figure 1. This
symmetric matrix is a trade cost matrix indicating that for instance the to-
tal import of a consumer located in region R1 of country C1 (ﬁrst line of Φ)
comprises its import from region R1 of country C1 (no trade costs incurred),
from region R2 of country C1 (φ1 incurred), from region R1 of country C2 (φ12
incurred), from region R2 of country C2 (φ12φ2 incurred), from region R1 of
country C3 (φ13 incurred) and from region R2 country C3 (φ13φ3 incurred).
Finally, let Y be a 6×6 diagonal matrix, representing the total income within
each of the six regions:
14Y =

                 

Y1,1 0 0 0 0 0
0 Y1,2 0 0 0 0
0 0 Y2,1 0 0 0
0 0 0 Y2,2 0 0
0 0 0 0 Y3,1 0
0 0 0 0 0 Y3,2

                 





where p is a scalar representing the equilibrium free-on-board price as in Section
2.1.7 The capital market clearing condition is:
N = λK (14)
where K is the stock of capital (assumed the same in any of the six regions)
owned by the consumers. The zero-proﬁt condition yields the following expres-
sion for the equilibrium rental rate:
RR = µ(p − α)(ΦY )(ΦN)
−1 (15)
where µ, p and α are scalars deﬁned as in Section 2.1.8 Plugging (14) in (15)
7Notice that in the previous expression, ΦN is a column vector and thus (ΦN)
1
1−σ is also
a column vector formed by the the elements of ΦN raised to the power 1/(1 − σ).
8Notice that in the previous expression, ΦN is a column vector and thus (ΦN)−1 is also a
column vector formed by the inverse of the elements of ΦN.






In fact, in the right hand side of equation (16), the term µ(p − α)/K is a
constant and will cancel out in the resolution of the equation system. We can
thus drop it. At equilibrium the rental rates are identical in the six regions (r)
and the income in each region will also be the same and characterized by the
parameter θ. Under these conditions, equation (16) becomes:
r1 = (ΦΘ)(Φλ)
−1 (17)
where 1 is the vector whose components are all equal to one and Θ is a 6 × 6




                 

θ11 0 0 0 0 0
0 θ12 0 0 0 0
0 0 θ21 0 0 0
0 0 0 θ22 0 0
0 0 0 0 θ31 0
0 0 0 0 0 θ32

                 

.
Equation (17) represents in fact six equations in seven unknowns, the equi-
librium rental rate r and the six industrial shares λ11, λ12, λ21, λ22, λ31 and λ32.
We need one closure equation that is given by λ32=1-(λ11+λ12+λ21+λ22+λ31).
16Thus, equation (17) will now depend on the six unknowns λ11, λ12, λ21, λ22,
λ31 and r and on the set of parameters deﬁned by Φ and Θ. This system of six
equations in six unknowns yields the equilibrium distribution of the M-sector
between the six regions when international transaction costs are non-prohibitive.
As usual, the questions of the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium
yielded by this system of equations have to be clearly addressed.
Ginsburgh et al (1986) demonstrated that such an equilibrium always exists
when the rental rate is a continuous function of λ, which is the case here since
capital is allowed to move freely across all the six regions. We need more algebra
to state the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
First, we have to re-express equation (17) by operating a suitable change of
variables to obtain a linear system of the form Y = ΦX. Let us mention the
basic change of variables needed:
a = (λ11 + λ12φ1) + (λ21φ12 + λ22φ12φ2) + (λ31φ13 + λ32φ13φ3)
b = (φ1λ11 + λ12) + (λ21φ12φ1 + λ22φ12φ1φ2) + (λ31φ13 + λ32φ13φ1φ3)
c = (λ21 + λ22φ2) + (λ11φ12 + λ12φ12φ1) + (λ31φ23 + λ32φ23φ3)
d = (φ2λ21 + λ22) + (λ11φ12φ2 + λ12φ12φ1φ2) + (λ31φ23φ2 + λ32φ23φ2φ3)
e = (λ31 + λ32φ3) + (λ11φ13 + λ32φ13φ1) + (λ21φ23 + λ22φ23φ2)
f = (φ3λ31 + λ32) + (λ11φ13φ3 + λ32φ13φ1φ3) + (λ21φ23φ3 + λ22φ23φ2φ3).
We then re-express equation (17) in an extensive form (equation by equa-
tion), use the relations above to make six changes of variables, and re-arrange
the six equations so as to obtain the linear form Y = ΦX. This system yields a
unique solution if the rank of matrix Φ is 6. A closer inspection of the deﬁnition
17of this matrix shows that none of the six columns forming matrix Φ can be
expressed as a linear combination of the others, a result that proves that matrix
Φ is of rank 6 and consequently, that the linear system has a unique solution.
The second step consists in using the change of variables expressions to
evaluate λ11, λ12, λ21, λ22, λ31 and r. After some tedious algebra, we obtain
six polynomial equations of degree 6. Building on the “Abel Theorem”, which
states that it is impossible to solve a polynomial equation of degree higher than 4
analytically, we have to resort to numerical simulations to obtain the equilibrium
distribution of ﬁrms described by equation (17). In the following Section, we
study the impact of a continuous reduction of the intra-RIA trade costs within
the RIA (φ12), the level of trade costs with the ROW being maintained at a
high level so as to accommodate with the developing context we are addressing.
3 Comparative statics analysis
Let us recall the geographical structure of our model. We have three devel-
oping “port-like economies” in which only the three principal regions are in-
volved in international transaction. Their hinterland regions face additional
trade costs to engage in international trade. We assume an even spread of cap-
ital and labor within the six regions of the model, (θ11,θ12,θ21,θ22,θ31,θ32)
= (1/6,1/6,1/6,1/6,1/6,1/6). In the simulations, we assume that the internal
trade costs in country C1 is φ1 = 0.9, which corresponds to a very good do-
mestic infrastructure level. The internal trade costs in country C3 is set to
18φ3 = 0.1, which corresponds to a quite bad domestic infrastructure level. The
international trade costs between the RIA’s members and country C3 are as-
sumed very high (we set φ13 = φ23 = 0.2). We then play on the intra-RIA
trade costs and the domestic trade costs of the second RIA member (country
C2). For the intra-RIA trade costs, we assume a continuous decrease reﬂecting
a reinforcement of the integration process (φ12 runs from 0, which corresponds
to autarky, to 1, which corresponds to free trade within the RIA).9 For the RIA
member facing higher domestic trade costs, we set diﬀerent values for φ2 that
illustrates an improvement of country C2’s domestic infrastructure towards the
level of country C1’s domestic infrastructure (here we only present three cases:
φ2 = 0, φ2 = 0.8 and φ2 = 0.9). We used the software GAMS to solve the
equations system and to perform all the following simulations.10
3.1 Impact of a continuous decrease of the intra-RIA trade
costs
In Figure 2-4, the y-axis represents the share of the industrial sector within the
three countries: λ11 + λ12 represents the sum of the industrial share of regions
R1 and R2 within country C1, λ21 + λ22 represents the sum of the industrial
share of regions R1 and R2 within country C2 and λ31 +λ32 represents the sum
of the industrial share of regions R1 and R2 within country C3. The dashed
9It is obvious that if all the φs in matrix Φ are equal to one, the determinant of matrix Φ
will be equal to zero and the system will not have a unique solution. Furthermore, when lots
of the elements of matrix Φ are equal or close to one, the determinant will be closer to zero
and the solution will be spurious. This is why in graphs 2-7, φ12 is less than 1 on the x-axis.
10See a presentation of this software on the website www.gams.com.
19curve speciﬁes country C3 left outside the RIA. The x-axis represents intra-RIA
trade costs φ12.
Let us ﬁrst assume that the domestic trade costs of our three countries are
such that φ1 > φ3 > φ2, which means that the hinterland region of country C2
faces higher trade costs than that of country C3 left out the RIA. Figure 2 focuses
on some speciﬁc parameter values. We have performed the same simulation
exercise for many other values corresponding to this ranking of domestic trade
costs and the outcome is the same.
In this conﬁguration, when trade costs are prohibitive within the RIA (φ12 =
0), countries C1 and C3 attract the same industrial share to the disadvantage
of country C2. At this point, trade is freer between the RIA’s members and
the ROW than within the RIA (φ12 < φ13 = φ23) and this gives the ROW
a market advantage. However, when trade costs are lowered within the RIA,
country C1, which possesses the best domestic infrastructure, takes advantage
of its integration with country C2 to attract a higher industrial share. This
leading position reinforces its attractiveness to the disadvantage of country C3
left outside the RIA, and as φ12 keeps increasing, the industrial share of country
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Figure 2: Industrial share in each of the 3 countries.
Now, let us assume that the domestic trade costs of our three countries are
such that φ1 > φ2 > φ3, which means that the hinterland region of country C3
faces higher trade costs than that of the two RIA members. Figure 3 focuses
on some speciﬁc parameter values. We have performed the same simulation
exercise for many other values corresponding to this ranking of domestic trade
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Figure 3: Industrial share in each of the 3 countries.
In this conﬁguration, country C3 left out of the RIA is disadvantaged even
when intra-RIA trade costs are very high. An interesting result here is that
the two RIA members initially (i.e. when the intra-RIA trade is still very
high) attract the same industrial share. As intra-RIA trade costs are lowered,
this stability is broken and a divergence process is triggered between them,
obviously to the advantage of country C1, which possesses the best domestic
infrastructure. We performed this simulation exercise for many other values of
φ1, φ2 and φ3 verifying φ1 > φ2 > φ3 and we noticed that as φ2 came closer to
φ1, the divergence process within the RIA was triggered for higher values of the
intra-RIA trade costs φ12. This result indicates that a common eﬀort of the RIA
members to strengthen their domestic infrastructure are more likely to induce
22a stable RIA. Figure 4 focuses on the case where the domestic infrastructures
within the RIA are harmonized to the level of the well-endowed partner.11 In
this conﬁguration, the two RIA members attract a slightly increasing industrial
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Figure 4: Industrial share in each of the 3 countries.
These three graphs point to three key results. First, country C1, which
possesses the best domestic infrastructure, attracts a higher industrial share
to the disadvantage of the two other countries. This result is a conﬁrmation
of the ﬁndings in Martin and Rogers (1995). Second, an improvement of the
domestic infrastructure of country C2 to the level of the well-endowed RIA
11In Figure 4, the curve representing λ31 + λ32 depicts a slight non-monotonicity, but this
is rather due to computation approximations under GAMS.
23member gives a global advantage to the RIA to the disadvantage of the ROW,
but a reinforcement of the integration can trigger a divergence process if the
domestic infrastructure of the RIA members is not exactly set to the same level.
This result extends the ﬁndings of Martin and Rogers (1995). Third, these
graphs give an insight on why some RIAs collapse. Indeed, as can be seen in
Figure 7, for very low intra-RIA trade costs (φ12 > 0.8), country C2 looses all
its industrial share and thus totally specializes in agriculture. To avoid this
situation, country C2 has a strong incentive to withdraw from the RIA so as to
protect its industrial share like country C3.
A side result is that a country remaining outside the RIA will see its indus-
trial sector threatened sooner or later by at least the well-endowed RIA member,
if not both members. Since the richness of the geography of our model helps us
to address the evolution of the principal and the hinterland regions as intra-RIA
trade costs are lowered, we dedicate the following subsection to the analysis of
the six regions described in Figure 1.
3.2 Evolution of the internal geography of the trading
partners
Let us mention that by geography, we mean the industrial share captured by
each of the six regions as the intra-RIA trade costs continuously decrease. In
our framework, each country has a principal region that is the entry and exit
point, and an hinterland region facing domestic trade costs. As in the previous
subsection, we focus on three key cases: when φ1 > φ3 > φ2, when φ1 > φ2 > φ3
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Figure 5: Industrial share in each of the 6 regions.
For this trade costs conﬁguration, the hinterland region of country C1 totally
specializes in the agricultural good since no M-ﬁrms are located in this region. In
return, region R1 attracts an increasing industrial share as trade becomes freer
within the RIA. In the second RIA country, the M-ﬁrms’ location is diﬀerent:
the hinterland region captures a constant industrial share while the principal
region looses M-ﬁrms until total specialization in the A-sector. This result is due
to the extreme assumption setting φ2 = 0. In such a situation, the hinterland
region is in autarky and since consumers like variety, some M-ﬁrms will locate to
this region to supply some industrial good. The country left outside the RIA is a
bit protected by the high trade costs with the RIA members (φ13 = φ23 = 0.2),
25but both the principal and the hinterland regions loose some industrial ﬁrms
to the advantage of country C1’s principal region R1 as the intra-RIA trade
costs are decreased. In country C3 too, the hinterland region attracts a higher
industrial share because of high domestic trade costs. The results are quite
diﬀerent when φ1 > φ2 > φ3. Figure 6 illustrates the speciﬁc case where
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Figure 6: Industrial share in each of the 6 regions.
For this second conﬁguration, the hinterland regions of the two RIA members
totally specialize in the A-sector for any level of intra-RIA trade costs. Since
domestic infrastructures are good within the RIA, capital owners are better
oﬀ investing their capital in a “big market” and take advantage of the good
intra-RIA accessibility. For very low intra-RIA trade costs, country C2 looses
26all its industrial sector to the advantage of the principal region of country C1.
Country C3 is aﬀected to a lower extent as intra-RIA trade costs are lowered,
but its principal region continuously looses some M-ﬁrms to the advantage of
region R1 of country C1 while its hinterland region keeps its industrial share.
Here again, high domestic trade costs react as “natural protection” for this
hinterland region.
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Figure 7: Industrial share in each of the 6 regions.
In this case, hinterland regions within the RIA totally specialize in agricul-
ture, while in return, the principal regions increasingly attract M-ﬁrms from
the principal region of the country left outside the RIA: at the country level, we
have a convergence of the RIA members industrial shares, while at the regional
27level, we have a divergence between principal and hinterland regions of the RIA
members.
These simulations show that a reduction in intra-RIA trade costs favors
convergence of the countries forming the RIA only when this is coupled with
an improvement of the domestic infrastructures of country C2 to the level of
country C1. Otherwise, the well-endowed country of the RIA attracts M-ﬁrms
from its partner and increases its industrial share as intra-RIA trade costs are
lowered. Hence, the uneven spread of economic activities observed within some
developing RIAs is not a fatality. Paving inter-states roads help to increase
intra-RIA trade ﬂows (Coulibaly and Fontagné, 2004), but less developed trad-
ing partners also need a common investment policy to improve their domestic
infrastructures to the level of the well-endowed members of the RIA.
4 Conclusion
This study is in line with the argument made by Henderson et al. (2001) sug-
gesting that “rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis is needed to increase
understanding of the role of geography in development and to better design de-
velopment policy”. We propose an explanation of the persistent uneven develop-
ment observed within some developing regional integration areas by focusing on
a geography that is characteristic of developing countries: we assume “port-like
economies” in which each country comprises a principal region endowed with
international infrastructures and an hinterland region. In addition to the two
28developing countries forming the RIA, the model includes a third (developing)
country left out of the integration process so as to evaluate the gains and losses
of being a RIA member.
The main result of the paper states that with initial diﬀerences in trans-
port infrastructures between the two countries forming the RIA, the integration
process will lead to a divergence between the countries. On the contrary, when
discrepancies in infrastructure equipment are reduced prior to the reduction in
intra-RIA trade costs, the divergence takes place inside each country, between
the access and the hinterland region. These results extend the ﬁndings by Martin
an Rogers (1995) since they examine regional divergence or convergence within
a country as the integration process is reinforced. This divergence process at
both region and country levels lead to a persistent uneven spread of economic
activities that can exacerbate tensions within regions and RIA members, hence
collapsing RIAs.
In this paper, we did not focus on the cost-beneﬁt and welfare implications of
infrastructure investment. However, the comparative statics of ﬁrms relocation
as domestic and international trade costs decrease give some insights on the
desirability of a harmonization of domestic infrastructures within RIA members,
e.g. to ensure them a higher industrial share to the disadvantage of countries
left out the RIA, but also for a regional compensation mechanism within each
member to help hinterland regions who may lose some of their industrial share
as integration proceeds. We however would need a complete policy cost-beneﬁt
analysis to evaluate this issue fully.
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